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NOTES
ZAPATA CORP. V MALDONADO: A MIDDLE
GROUND WHEN APPLYING THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE TO
THE TERMINATION OF
DERIVATIVE SUITS
The judicially created business judgment rule' shields officers and direc-
tors of a corporation from personal liability in the exercise of their corpo-
rate duties.2 Under the business judgment rule, directors will not be held
liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgment, unless it can be shown
that the directors acted in bad faith or with corrupt motive.3
This rule serves several purposes: First, it encourages qualified persons
to become directors by assuring them that they will not be held to a higher
1. See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) ("[T]he law will not hold directors liable for honest errors, for
mistakes of judgment, when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith."). In addi-
tion to imposing a standard of care for directors, the business judgment rule traditionally
imposes the burden of proving lack of good faith or due care on the plaintiff shareholder.
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Although the business judg-
ment rule may be raised as a defense to any business decision in which directors exercise
discretion, this Note will focus primarily on the directors' decision not to pursue a corporate
cause of action. For further discussion of the rule, see infra notes 30-41 and accompanying
text.
2. The officers and directors of a corporation are empowered, by state statute and by
corporation bylaws, to act on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp.
1981-82); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 35 4.01 (1971). Although the business
judgment rule generally protects executive officers of a corporation from personal liability,
W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039, this Note will focus on directors' liability.
3. In the seminal case of Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939), the Delaware court
asserted that although officers and directors are technically not trustees, they must show
"undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation." Id at 510. The court stated that this
rule flows from both a long-standing public policy and profound knowledge of human char-
acteristics. Id In applying the determinations of honesty, good faith and undivided loyalty,
the court recognized that no hard and fast rule could be formulated. In Delaware, the stan-
dard to which directors are held is still determined by case law. However, 20 states have
now codified a standard of care, eight of which have followed, in some respect, the Model
Business Corporation Act § 35. Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Un-
charted Reef? An Analysis of the ModelAct Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law,
35 Bus. LAW. 919, 920-21 (1980). See infra note 34.
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standard of care than that expected of them in the exercise of their own
business affairs.4 Second, the rule promotes business economy by discour-
aging individual shareholders from bringing suit every time a decision
with which they disagree is made.' Third, it fosters judicial economy by
foreclosing inquiry into the everyday decisions of a corporation.
6
The business judgment rule has been used traditionally as a defensive
shield to protect directors from personal liability when their decisions have
been attacked by dissatisified shareholders.7 In addition to protecting di-
rectors from personal liability in their business judgments, the rule may
also serve as a barrier to the maintenance of shareholder derivative suits.
8
A decision by the board of directors not to bring a suit against a third party
is ordinarily respected as a legitimate exercise of business judgment.9 The
rule, however, was not meant to preclude shareholder derivative suits
when the directors' refusal to bring suit against a third party was in breach
of trust or when a majority of the directors were involved in the alleged
4. See Godbold v. Branch Bank, II Ala. 191 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.)
68, 78 (La. 1829); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 95
(1979).
5. Arsht, supra note 4, at 95. In addition to discouraging litigious shareholders, the
rule encourages entrepreneurial risk-taking. Johnson & Osborne, The Role of The Business
Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. U.L. REV. 49, 54 (1980). See also Coffee &
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit.- An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 281 (1981). ("[N]ormal business judgments are often made
under time pressure and uncertainty, which preclude studied reflection or textbook style
decision-making." However, the authors distinguish ordinary business judgments from a
decision not to bring suit because the elements of time pressure and uncertainty are not as
prevalent in the decision not to sue. Id).
6. Arsht, supra note 4, at 95; see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1935)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If a stockholder could compel the officers to enforce every legal
right, courts, instead of chosen officers, would be the arbiters of the corporation's fate."). In
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926
(1979), the court stated that the business judgment rule is also grounded on the recognition
of the peculiar qualifications that directors of the corporation possess: "[C]ourts are ill
equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business
judgments." Id
7. E.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del. Ch. 1980) ("[I]ts character as a
purely defensive rule has never been seriously challenged."). See also Hinsey, Maldonado
(NY) v. Maldonado (DE): Which Prevails?, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 4,1980, at 19, col. 2.
8. A shareholder derivative suit is a cause of action brought by shareholders to redress
a harm to the corporation. The suit is "derivative" in that it is brought on behalf of and for
the direct benefit of the corporation. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder
Litigation.- The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96 n. I (1980). The deriva-
tive suit can only be brought "[w]hen the corporate cause of action is for some reason not
asserted by the corporation itself." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360, at 756 (2d ed. 1970).
9. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264
(1917). See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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wrongdoing.'" In such a case, a shareholder, on behalf of the corporation,
could bring a derivative suit to redress the wrong.'"
Recently, corporations have attempted to use the business judgment rule
offensively by blocking derivative suits, even when a majority of directors
are alleged to be wrongdoers or are deemed "interested." 2 Once a share-
holder suit is initiated, the board may appoint a special "disinterested"
litigation committee' 3 which is given authority to investigate the share-
holder's claim and to determine whether the suit is in the best interests of
the corporation. In all reported cases, these committees have either moved
to dismiss or requested summary judgment, on the grounds that the suit is
not in the best interests of the corporation.'
4
Courts are split as to the propriety of this offensive use'5 of the business
judgment rule. Most courts that have addressed the issue have approved of
such use and have limited their inquiry to the issues of the good faith and
10. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 319 (1936); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amal-
gamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining
Co., 187 U.S. 455, 461 (1903); Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1882); Ash v.
IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Rogers v. American Can
Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962). See also 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5822 (rev. perm. ed. 1980); Dent, supra note 8, at 102.
11. As "managers" of the corporation, directors are first given the opportunity to main-
tain the derivative suit in the corporation's name. If they refuse to pursue the litigation, the
business judgment rule is triggered. The directors' decision will be respected unless either
bad faith is shown or a majority of the directors are implicated in the alleged wrongdoing.
See infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
12. The term "interested director" is most commonly employed when the director has a
financial interest in the outcome of a transaction. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)
(1974). More generally, the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 41 2 comment (1971)
states that a "conflict of interest exists in every situation where a director's personal interest
conflicts with his duty to the corporation."
13. State statutes generally provide for the appointment of committees as outlined in
the corporation's bylaws, articles of incorporation, or certificate of incorporation. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 42 1 (1971).
14. Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL
L. REV. 600, 602 (1980). For examples of factors the litigation committee considers in reach-
ing its decision to terminate the suit, see Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 771, 767 n. I (9th
Cir. 1981) (possibility of recovery, cost of litigation, reputation and standing in business
community, effect on morale of employees, etc.); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625,
393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1979) (whether the action was meritorious, the
waste of the time and talent of management, unlikelihood of success, and whether the repu-
tation of the company would be damaged).
15. The use is "offensive" in that the litigation committee invokes the business judg-
ment rule as authority for terminating the shareholder's suit. As a result, the original busi-
ness decision that gave rise to the shareholder suit is never examined by the courts. Rather,
the judicial inquiry is limited to whether the litigation committee's decision not to sue is a
valid exercise of business judgment.
1982]
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independence of the committee and the reasonableness of the investiga-
tion. " A vocal minority of courts, however, rejects the offensive use of the
business judgment rule and has denied committees' motions to dismiss.
These courts conclude that the business judgment rule is not an independ-
ent source of power by which a committee may seek dismissal of a share-
holder derivative suit.' 7 Nevertheless, because a majority of courts grants
the committees' motions to dismiss, several commentators have forecasted
the demise of the shareholder derivative suit unless some judicial action is
taken to check the automatic application of the business judgment rule.'
8
16. In upholding the offensive use of the business judgment rule, the courts have varied
in the level of deference shown to the committee's decision to terminate the litigation. For
examples of the most deferential inquiries, see Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 772 (9th
Cir. 1981) (construing California law) (remand unnecessary; record establishes beyond ques-
tion the independence of the committee); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (construing Delaware law) ("the rule ap-
parently applies to any reasonable good faith determination") (emphasis added); Lewis v.
Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (construing California law) (followingAbbey
and stating that good faith determination "is immune to attack by shareholders or the
courts"); Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp. 120, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (construing Dela-
ware law) (no discovery of independence and good faith of committee was sought by plain-
tiff, and no evidentiary proof was raised as to these issues; dismissal granted); Maldonado v.
Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274,278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (construing Delaware law) (rule is "highly
deferential" and committee's decision is "insulated from shareholder challenge and judicial
scrutiny").
For those opinions showing less deference to the litigation committee, see Rosengarten v.
ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (decision on motion for summary judgment was
postponed pending deposition of the committee members by the plaintiff shareholders);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 637, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 931
(1979) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (since knowledge of motives and actions of committee mem-
bers and defendants is peculiarly within the defendants' knowledge, summary judgment is
improper prior to disclosure proceedings); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to test the bona fides and indepen-
dence of the Special Committee through discovery and, if necessary, at a plenary hearing.").
17. The minority position rejects the relevancy of the business judgment rule to a com-
mittee's motion to terminate a shareholder suit. In Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1263 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd, Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), the court's
analysis of the dual nature led it to conclude that once a properly initiated shareholder
derivative suit is brought (see infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of a
properly initiated suit), the shareholder then possesses an independent right to maintain the
suit, and the corporation no longer has control. Id See also Abella v. Universal Leaf To-
bacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex.
1980). For further discussion of the minority position, see infra notes 99-105 and accompa-
nying text.
18. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 8, at 110-17 (proposing a "per se rule" that bars a minor-
ity of board members from terminating suits against a majority of directors); Note, supra
note 14, at 633 (advocating use of the business judgment rule only as a defense to the alleged
violation at a trial on the merits); Black & Smith, Business Judgment, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 935,
938 (1980) (requiring a limited inquiry on the merits in all cases involving dismissal of deriv-
ative suits on the basis of the business judgment rule). Two recent articles have advocated
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Recognizing the ramifications of this trend, the Delaware Supreme
Court, in Zapata v. Maldonado, 9 attempted to establish a balancing point
between bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate causes of action
and a corporation's power to insulate itself from frivolous litigation. 20 The
court, in a case of first impression, examined when, and under what cir-
cumstances, an independent committee of the board of directors could suc-
cessfully dismiss a stockholder's derivative suit under Delaware law.2
In 1975, Maldonado, a shareholder of Zapata Corporation, brought a
stockholder's derivative suit against Zapata and individual defendants
who were members of the board of directors. The complaint, filed in the
Court of Chancery of Delaware, alleged breach of fiduciary duty in con-
nection with the board's decision to accelerate the date for the exercise of
stock options in 1974.22
Four years later, in 1979, Zapata's directors appointed an independent
investigative committee, comprised of two newly appointed directors. The
committee was authorized to investigate the claims asserted against Zapata
and the individual defendants and to take appropriate action. Based on its
findings, the committee concluded that the litigation was not in the best
interests of the corporation, and Zapata moved to dismiss in all the pend-
ing suits.
21
The Court of Chancery of Delaware denied Zapata's motion to dis-
miss.24 The lower court reasoned that while the business judgment rule
protects directors from liability, it does not give them an independent right
to dismiss derivative suits. Rather, when directors refuse to institute legal
proceedings for breach of fiduciary duty, the stockholder possesses an "in-
legislative reform over judicial case-by-case development. See Block & Prussin, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27
(1981); Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 5.
19. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
20. Id at 787.
21. Id at 785.
22. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254-55 (Del. Ch. 1980).
23. 413 A.2d at 1255. In June 1977, Maldonado filed a complaint in United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging violations under §§ 10(b),
14(a) and 7 of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n, 78g (1976). Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). A similar action against Zapata was also
pending in United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Maher v.
Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980). The federal court in New York was the first to
entertain the motion. Following the two-step approach in Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471
(1979), see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text, the court determined that Delaware
law permitted an independent committee to exercise its business judgment to dismiss a
shareholder's derivative suit and that such power was n-o-tinc-nsistent with the policies of
the Securities Exchange Act. Maldonado, 485 F. Supp. at 279-80.
24. 413 A.2d at 1263.
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dependent right to redress the wrong. 
' 25
Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court
shortly after its motion was denied.26 The court reversed the interlocutory
order and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with its new
two-step approach.
In establishing a middle ground between the rights of individual share-
holders and the concerns of corporate economy, the court held that a prop-
erly initiated derivative suit could not be terminated by an independent
committee unless: (1) the corporation proved the good faith and indepen-
dence of the committee and demonstrated that the committee had made a
reasonable investigation;2 7 and (2) the reviewing court, if it chose to exer-
cise its discretion, agreed in its independent business judgment that the suit
should be dismissed.2" This two-step approach radically departs from re-
cent decisions concerning the business judgment rule in shareholder deriv-
ative actions,29 by shifting the burden of proof to the committee to
establish its good faith and independence and by providing an opportunity
for a court to exercise its independent business judgment as to whether or
not the derivative suit should be terminated.
This Note will examine the two-step approach delineated in Zapata and
discuss how it departs from the recent trend concerning the business judg-
ment rule in derivative suits. It will analyze whether the Delaware
Supreme Court has provided sufficient guidance for courts in considering
the decision of an independent committee to dismiss a derivative suit and
will discuss the possible impact of the decision on the future of shareholder
derivative suits.
25. Id at 1262.
26. The appeal was accepted on June 5, 1980. However, on May 29, 1980, Maldonado's
complaint in the Delaware court was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata because of the
January 24, 1980 decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
Vice Chancellor held that Maldonado had impermissibly split his cause of action because he
could have litigated his common law claims in the New York court. Black & Smith, Business
Judgment, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 935, 936 (1980). The dismissal, however, was expressly condi-
tioned upon the Second Circuit affirming the decision of the lower court. The Second Cir-
cuit appeal was then ordered stayed, pending the resolution of the appeal to the Delaware
Supreme Court. 430 A.2d at 781.
27. 430 A.2d at 788.
28. Id at 789.
29. See supra note 16 and cases cited therein. The burden of proof is now on the corpo-
ration to prove good faith, independence and a reasonable investigation. While not going so
far as to hold that a group of directors appointed by their peers could never be "independ-
ent," the Zapata decision recognizes the potential for subconscious abuse inherent when
fellow directors are passing judgment on their peers. 430 A.2d at 787.
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I. THE TRADITIONAL DEFENSIVE USE OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
The early application of the business judgment rule involved allegations
of breach of fiduciary duties against directors." ° The earliest expression of
the business judgment rule was in 1829 by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Percy v. Millaudon."3 The stockholders of Planters' Bank brought an ac-
tion to obtain a settlement of accounts, alleging fraudulent and unfaithful
conduct by the board of directors of the bank. In assessing the liability of
the directors, the court stressed that directors must not be held responsible
for a course of conduct if "the error was one into which a prudent man
might have fallen."32 The court reasoned that to require a standard of care
higher than that of the prudent man would be to presuppose perfect wis-
dom in fallible beings and severely discourage anyone from assuming the
duties of director.33
The traditional "defensive" use of the business judgment rule remains
substantially unaltered today.34 Because directors stand in a fiduciary rela-
30. For the application of the business judgment rule in a shareholder's suit to compel a
cause of action against a third party, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
31. 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
32. Id at 78.
33. Id. In another early case, Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191 (1874), the Ala-
bama Supreme Court applied the business judgment rule to a director's misunderstanding of
law. A shareholder brought suit against a bank's director to recover unlawful payments to a
board-appointed agent. The court reasoned that directors, by necessity, must enjoy wide
discretion in both the wisdom and legality of the decisions made by them. Id at 199. To
require "perfect knowledge" from directors may discourage a course of action that should
have been pursued, but was not, due to the deterrent of personal liability. Id
34. Arsht, supra note 4, at 134 (while recognizing the varying judicial expressions of the
rule, the author finds that a careful reading of the cases suggests the rule remains substan-
tially unchanged).
Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which has become the generally ac-
cepted standard for directorial conduct, mirrors these early decisions. Section 35 reads:
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a member
of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good faith, in a man-
ner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under simi-
lar circumstances. In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on
information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and
other financial data, in each case prepared by:
(a) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented,
(b) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which the direc-
tor reasonably believes to be within such person's professional or expert compe-
tence, or
(c) a committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly designated in
accordance with a provision of the articles of incorporation or the by-laws, as to
matters within its designated authority, which committee the director reasonably
1982]
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tionship to the corporation and its shareholders, their decisions are judged
according to whether the best interests of the corporation are served. 3' The
rule remains an effective shield against attacks on directors' decisions, un-
less the plaintiff establishes that the directors acted in bad faith or without
due care. Plaintiffs can normally carry this burden if they establish that the
director personally gained from a particular corporate transaction, i.e.,
self-dealing, or failed to evaluate viable alternatives that a prudent person
would have evaluated.36
The business judgment rule is frequently characterized as a factual pre-
sumption in favor of directors,37 placing the burden on the plaintiff to es-
tablish lack of due care or bad faith. Under the rule, courts generally will
not inquire into the merits of a business judgment. Thus, courts avoid sub-
stituting their judgment as to what is or is not in the best interests of the
corporation."
Yet, a court will inquire into the merits of a decision in so far as it is
necessary to consider the allegations of lack of due care or bad faith. A
recent Delaware case is illustrative. In Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc. ,3
a stockholder sought to enjoin the sale of a subsidiary of the corporation
for $480 million. The plaintiff charged that the fair market value of the
property was $761 million.40 While recognizing the presumption of good
faith and due care the directors' decision enjoys, the court granted the
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction barring the sale, because it
had serious doubts about the reasonableness of the corporation's
decision.4'
believes to merit confidence, but he shall not be considered to be acting in good
faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that would cause such
reliance to be unwarranted, A person who so performs his duties shall have no
liability by reason of being or having been a director of the corporation.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 2d § 35 (1971).
35. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. Ch. 1939). See also supra note 3.
36. See Arsht, supra note 4, at 100; W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1040 (the rule "does
not apply where the loss is the result of failure to exercise proper care, skill and diligence.").
37. For a discussion of the parameters of this presumption and its procedural impact,
see Arsht, supra note 4, at 130-33.
38. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979).
The latter, substantive decision falls squarely within the embrace of the business
judgment doctrine, involving as it did the weighing and balancing of legal, ethical,
commercial, promotional, public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the
resolution of many if not most corporate problems. To this extent the conclusion
reached . . . is outside the scope of our review.
Block & Prussin, supra note 18, at 37.
39. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aftgd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
40. Id at 604.
41. Id at 615.
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The so-called "defensive" use of the business judgment rule also serves
as a barrier to the maintenance of a shareholder derivative suit. As early as
1916, the United States Supreme Court, in United Copper Securities Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co. ,42 held that a directorial decision to seek en-
forcement of a corporate cause of action against a third party is ordinarily
within the directors' discretion.43
II. THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT
A. The Requirement of a Demand
The business judgment rule is inextricably intertwined with the share-
holder derivative suit. Because the derivative suit is an action asserting a
right belonging to the corporation, and not an individual right of its share-
holders," a plaintiff-shareholder must overcome two barriers before being
allowed to proceed with the lawsuit. The first barrier, almost procedural in
nature, requires the shareholder to make a demand on the board of direc-
tors to initiate the suit.45
The demand rule requires a shareholder to exhaust intracorporate reme-
dies before bringing a suit to enforce a corporate right. The primary pur-
pose of making a demand on the directors or comparable authority to
bring the action the shareholder desires is to allow the directors to occupy
their usual status as managers of the corporation's affairs.46 The board's
refusal to bring suit, once demand is made upon it, is protected by the
business judgment rule and will be respected, unless the shareholder can
carry the burden of proof and show that the refusal was wrongful.47
42. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
43. Id. at 263.
44. See supra note 8.
45. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, the stockholder must make a demand on the directors
or, if necessary, the shareholders, to bring the suit. The Rule states in part:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce
a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or
association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege. . . with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by theplaintiff to obtain the action he desiresfrom the directors or compa-
rable authority and if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the rea-
sons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.
(emphasis added).
46. Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Ac-
tions, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 168, 171 (1976). See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated
Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917); McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931).
For a discussion of when demand is required of shareholders, see Note, Demand on Directors
and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to A Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 754-759
(1960).
47. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
19821
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In some instances, however, demand may be futile and will be excused.
If the shareholder does not make the demand, the complaint must state the
reasons for failing to make the effort to have the board bring the suit.
48
The most common situations in which a demand is futile are when a ma-
jority of the board are alleged to be wrongdoers or where the defendants
otherwise control the board or corporation through ownership of the ma-
jority of voting stock. The rationale for excusing demand in these situa-
tions is that the alleged wrongdoers cannot be expected to sue
themselves.
49
This exception was recognized in the leading Delaware case of McKee v.
Rogers."° In McKee, the shareholder sought to enforce the collection of a
judgment previously entered in favor of the corporation, Standard Miner-
als Corporation, against the defendant Rogers." The bill alleged that Rog-
ers controlled the board of directors of Standard Minerals Corporation.
The court agreed that there was no certainty that the corporation would
sue Rogers, or, if it did sue, that the prosecution of the suit would be en-
trusted to the proper hands.52 "[A] stockholder may sue . . . without prior
demand upon the directors to sue, when it is apparent that a demand
would be futile, that the officers are under an influence that sterilizes direc-
tion and could not be proper persons to conduct the litigation."53
B. The "Standing" Requirement
If, after making demand on the board to pursue a corporate action, the
board agrees to initiate the suit, the shareholders' part in the lawsuit is
ended. On the other hand, if the board refuses to sue after demand is made
or demand is excused as futile, the shareholders must then overcome the
second barrier to shareholder derivative suits by establishing that they
have standing to sue. 4
(1917) ("[c]ourts interfere seldom to control such discretion ... except where the directors
are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual rela-
tionship which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment .. "); Hawes v. Oakland,
104 U.S. 450 (1882); Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1981); 13 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 10, § 5970 (rev. perm. ed. 1980).
48. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, supra note 45.
49. See Dent, supra note 8, at 98-99; Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a
Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 753 (1960).
50. 156 A. 191 (Del. Ch. 1931). Accord United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Cop-
per Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
51. See id at 191-92.
52. See id at 193.
53. Id
54. "Standing" in shareholder derivative actions is a term of art arising from the early
case of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 462 (1882). See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note
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In a number of early cases discussing a shareholder's standing to bring a
cause of action against a third party on behalf of the corporation, the
United States Supreme Court articulated the circumstances when a share-
holder can enforce the rights of the corporation. In Hawes v. Oakland,
5
the Court held that the shareholder must first allege one of the following:
1) some action or threatened action beyond the charter's authority; 2) a
fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated that will seriously harm
the best interests of the corporation or the shareholders; 3) self-interest on
the part of a majority of the board which is harmful to corporate and
shareholder interests; or 4) an oppressive and illegal course of action in the
name of the corporation by a majority of the board which violates share-
holders' rights and which is enjoinable only by a court of equity.56
Over thirty years later, in 1916, the Supreme Court considered whether
bringing a corporate cause of action against third parties is a matter for
decision by the board of directors. United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalga-
mated Copper Co. 51 was a derivative suit alleging antitrust violations of
the company's competitors. Consistent with the principles of Hawes, the
Court held that "[w]hether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the
courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions, ordi-
narily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of the
directors, in the absence of instruction by vote of the stock holders."58 The
Court recognized an exception to this rule when directors are guilty of a
breach of trust or where they stand in a dual relationship which would
interfere with an unbiased judgment.5 9
This extension of the business judgment rule as a "standing" require-
ment for the maintenance of shareholder derivative suits against third par-
ties was uniformly followed by courts throughout the first seventy years of
this century.6' In the past ten years, however, corporations have sought
5, at 262; Comment, supra note 46, at 191. The use of standing in derivative suits should be
distinguished from its familiar use in administrative actions where the standing doctrine is
used to ensure that the plaintiff has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation to
warrant judicial review. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 501-45 (1965).
55. 104 U.S. 450 (1882) In Hawes, the shareholder of a water works company chal-
lenged the board's refusal to comply with his demand to bring proceedings against the city
of Oakland for an excess supply of free water.
56. See id at 460.
57. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
58. Id at 263.
59. See id at 264.
60. See, e.g., Ash v. IBM, 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965). The plaintiff, stockholder of
three corporations, sought to enjoin IBM from acquiring the assets of another corporation,
alleging a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1964). The court held that
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further expansion of this barrier. This expansion typically has been sought
when a majority of the board is implicated in a shareholder suit and, there-
fore, is unable to invoke business judgment protection.6' The board then
appoints a special, disinterested committee which is given authority to in-
vestigate the suit. Invariably, after investigation, the committee moves to
dismiss the suit as not in the best interests of the corporation.62 The major-
ity of courts has respected the committees' decisions, applying the tradi-
tional defensive business judgment rule rationale to justify this offensive
use of the rule.
III. "OFFENSIVE" USE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Early Illegal Foreign Payments Cases
Gall v. Exxon Corp. 63 was the first case in which a corporation used the
business judgment rule to terminate a shareholder derivative action.
Shareholders brought an action in United States district court against the
corporation and its directors to recover allegedly illegal payments and
bribes made to various Italian political parties and businesses between
1963 and 1974.64 The board appointed a special litigation committee to
investigate the allegations and determine what action the corporation
should take. After a four month investigation, the committee concluded
that it would not be in the best interests of the corporation to maintain
legal action against any present or former director of Exxon. 65
Relying on early Supreme Court decisions dealing with third party liti-
66gation, 6 the district court granted the committee's motion to dismiss. The
court held that the committee's decision not to sue, "like any other busi-
ness decision, must be made by the corporate directors in the exercise of
their sound business judgment.
6 7
The district court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that the decision
the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, since "nothing is pleaded or even suggested to indicate
that the refusal of the directors to sue was fraudulent or collusive, or represented anything
worse than unsound business judgment honestly exercised in the corporate interest." 353
F.2d at 492. See also Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-60 (7th Cir. 1958); 13 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 10, § 5822.
61. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
64. For a general discussion of the application of the business judgment rule in cases
involving illegal foreign payments, see Johnson, The Business Judgment Rule: .4 Review of its
Application to the Problem of Illegal Foreign Payments, 6 J. CORP. L. 481 (1981).
65. 418 F. Supp. at 510, 514.
66. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
67. 418 F. Supp. at 518.
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of the committee was, in effect, the decision of those accused of the wrong-
doing. The court was not persuaded by the plaintiffs contention that the
board could have caused the committee to act contrary to its determina-
tion; rather, the proper focus of the business judgment rule is "on those
who actually wield the decision-making authority, not on those who might
have possessed such authority at different times and under different cir-
cumstances." 68 Thus, with little or no discussion of this expanded applica-
tion of the business judgment rule, Gall laid the foundation for other
courts to decide accordingly.69 Three years later, the New York Court of
Appeals entertained the question of an independent committee's power to
terminate a shareholder's suit in Auerbach v. Bennett.70 Auerbach also in-
volved illegal foreign payments, and the New York court reached a con-
clusion similar to that of the Southern District of New York. Moreover,
the state court outlined its reasoning in more detail. The Auerbach court
examined two separate corporate transactions; 71 the first dealt with the al-
legations of illegal bribes and kickbacks made by the board of General
Telephone & Electronics Corporation, 72 and the second involved the com-
mittee's decision that a suit against the directors is not in the best interests
of the corporation. The court stated that because the committee's decision
not to sue is also entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule,
the first corporate action is necessarily insulated from judicial inquiry.73
While asserting that judicial inquiry into the committee's evaluation of
the motion to dismiss the shareholder suit was inappropriate because of
the business judgment protection, the New York court found it appropriate
to review the methodologies and procedures the committee used to arrive
at its conclusion. 74 Nevertheless, the court found nothing in the record to
challenge the good faith pursuit of the investigation by the committee and
denied the plaintiff-shareholder's request for further disclosure."
68. Id. at 516-17.
69. Eg., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979), af 'g 460 F.
Supp. 1242, 1245-46 (D. Minn. 1978). See also discussion ofAbbey, infra at text accompany-
ing notes 83-90.
70. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
71. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929 ("As to the methodologies and
procedures best suited to the conduct of an investigation of facts and the determination of
legal liability, the courts are well equipped by long and continuing experience and practice
to make determinations.").
75. Id at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. However, in his dissenting
opinion, Chief Judge Cooke argued that summary judgment should not have been granted
prior to disclosure proceedings "because certain defendants and the members of the commit-
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B. Burks v. Lasker." The Supreme Court's Implicit Approval
The Supreme Court implicitly approved the power of an independent
committee to terminate a shareholder suit in Burks v. Lasker,76 when it
remanded the case for a determination of state law. In Burks, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that dis-
interested directors had the power to dismiss a derivative suit under the
Federal Investment Company Act of 1940.77 In construing the federal
statute, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed," stating that
to hold otherwise would violate the intent of Congress to protect the public
interest.79
The-Supreme Court, addressing the issue whether federal or state law
controlled, reversed, holding that "federal courts should apply state law
governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative
suits to the extent such law is consistent with the policies of the . . . [fed-
eral law]." 8 In dictum, the Court implicitly approved the Gall approach,
stating that "[tihere may well be situations in which the independent direc-
tors could reasonably believe the best interests of the shareholders call for
a decision not to sue. . ;" the Court continued, noting that in some situa-
tions "it would certainly be consistent with the Act to allow the independ-
ent directors to terminate a suit, even though not frivolous."'"
C Post-Burks." The Recognition of a "Clear Trend" in Corporate Law
The Burks decision thus paved the way for lower courts to determine
whether applicable state law permits the establishment of an independent
committee to make a business decision that maintaining the suit is not in
the best interests of the corporation. An affirmative determination can be
made, even when the plaintiff-shareholder alleges violation of a federal
statute and not just common law breach of fiduciary duties.8 2
tee are possessed of exclusive knowledge of the facts ... [and for this reason] the intervenor
is now unable to suggest the possible avenues which might successfully be pursued upon
pretrial disclosure." Id at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
76. 441 U.S. 471 (1979), rev'g 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978).
77. Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The plaintiff-shareholders in
Burks brought suit against the directors for violations of the directors' duties under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976); the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976); and for common law breach of fiduciary duty.
404 F. Supp. at 1174.
78. 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978).
79. Id at 1210-11.
80. 441 U.S. at 486.
81. Id at 485.
82. 441 U.S. at 478-79.
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Shortly after the Burks decision, another illegal foreign payment case
arose in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
was presented with the issue of whether Delaware law permits an in-
dependent committee to dismiss a shareholder derivative suit. In Abbey v.
Control Data Corp. ,83 the shareholder brought suit alleging common law
violations of corporate waste and mismanagement, along with violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193484 in regard to proxy solicita-
tions and registration materials filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.85
In examining Delaware law, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on United
Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co. 86 for the proposition
that a decision to bring suit is ordinarily a question for the directors of the
corporation. 7 As in Gall, the court failed to distinguish United Copper Se-
curities Co., a case involving a shareholder suit to compel a suit against a
third party, from a shareholder suit against the directors for breach of
fiduciary duties.88 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiffs ar-
gument that "the applicability of the business judgment rule hinges on the
nature of the plaintiff-shareholder's cause of action."89 The court con-
cluded, moreover, that the special litigation committee's decision not to
sue was protected by the business judgment rule, despite allegations of
criminal misconduct.9°
Prior to the decision in Maldonado v. Flynn,9  the Gall, Auerbach and
Abbey opinions appeared to have established a "clear trend" in corporate
law. In Gaines v. Haughton,92 the United States Court of Appeals for the
83. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979).
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1976).
85. 603 F.2d at 726-27. The stockholder sought recovery of $1,381,000 in civil and
criminal penalties from senior officers and directors. In 1978, Control Data Corp. pled
guilty to criminal charges brought by the Justice Department under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976)
and 31 U.S.C. § 1059 (1976). See 603 F.2d at 726 n.2.
86. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
87. See 603 F.2d at 729. See also notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
88. See Black & Prussin, supra note 18, at 47.
89. 603 F.2d at 729-30.
90. Id at 730. The Eighth Circuit accepted the conclusion in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), that the rule "applies to any reasonable good faith determina-
tion by an independent board of directors that the derivative action suit is not in the best
interests of the corporation." 603 F.2d at 730.
91. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). In Maldonado, the
court concluded that the independent committee does not have the power to terminate a
shareholder suit because the shareholder possesses an independent right to redress the
wrong once the corporation refuses to institute legal proceedings. See infra notes 97-106 and
accompanying text.
92. 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff-shareholder brought suit against the majority
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Ninth Circuit predicted that the California state court would follow the
trend reflected in these decisions. The Gaines court, in light of the number
of decisions following the views expressed in Abbey and Auerbach, reaf-
firmed an earlier opinion upholding the power of an independent commit-
tee to terminate shareholder litigation 93 and limited the judicial role "to
determining the disinterested independence of the committee members
and the appropriateness and sufficiency of the investigative procedures
chosen and pursued by the committee."'94 The court refused the plaintiffs
request for remand to the lower court for further findings of fact relating to
the investigatory procedures of the committee. Instead, it stated that the
record "establishes beyond question" both the independence of the com-
mittee and the adequacy of the procedures. 95
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, was not as deferential to the
independent committee's decision to terminate a shareholder suit in
Zapata. Rather, the court formulated a two-step approach to follow when
considering an independent committee's motion to dismiss, which is likely
to curb the "clear trend" referred to in Gaines.
IV. ZA PA TA CORP. V MALDONADO: THE Two-STEP APPROACH AND
REJECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RATIONALE
In 1970, the Zapata board of directors adopted a stock option plan, to be
exercised in five separate installments, which gave certain officers and di-
rectors the option to purchase Zapata common stock at $12.15 per share.
The plan provided that the fifth installment was to be exercised on July 14,
1974. Zapata's directors later accelerated this date to July 2, 1974. Maldo-
nado claimed that the board (most of whom were entitled to purchase
stock under the plan) advanced the exercise date from July 14 to July 2,
1974 in order to avoid additional, substantial federal income tax liability.
A tender offer announcement was expected just prior to July 14, 1974, at
which time the market price of Zapata stock would increase.96 Maldonado
alleged that this acceleration resulted in the loss of a federal tax deduction
to the corporation equal to the amount of the tax liability saved by the
of Lockheed directors for common law breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste for $30
to $38 million payments to foreign governments).
93. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
94. 645 F.2d at 771.
95. Id at 772.
96. 413 A.2d at 1254. It was predicted that the market price of Zapata stock would rise
from $18 to $19 per share to close to the tender offer price of $25 per share. On the date the




In 1975, Maldonado filed a complaint in the Court of Chancery of Dela-
ware, alleging that the directors breached their fiduciary duty to Zapata
and its stockholders. Four years later, the directors appointed an in-
dependent investigative committee.9" After a three-month investigation,
the committee concluded that the litigation was not in the best interests of
the corporation and instructed Zapata's counsel to move for dismissal.
The lower court denied Zapata's motion. In a well reasoned opinion
authored by Vice Chancellor Hartnett, the court held that the business
judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of the power of an independent
committee to terminate a shareholder derivative suit.99 The court distin-
guished the application of the business judgment rule in two situations. If
the committee's decision not to sue was attacked as improper, the rule
would protect the committee members from personal liability, absent bad
faith or lack of due care. The court contrasted this defensive use of the rule
with its offensive use as an independent conferral of power to terminate a
derivative suit.I°"
In his suit, Maldonado was not attacking the committee's decision to
dismiss but, rather, the board's decision to accelerate the stock option date
in 1974 as a breach of fiduciary duty."0' Therefore, the court reasoned, the
committee's exercise of its business judgment to dismiss the suit, regardless
of its propriety, is irrelevant to the question of whether the committee pos-
sesses the power to terminate derivative suits.
The court distinguished the early Supreme Court cases 10 2 relied upon by
the committee for support of its motion to dismiss as involving third party
litigation where no breach of fiduciary duties or improper board conduct
was alleged.'0 3 Instead, the court looked beyond the business judgment
97. The amount of capital gain for federal income tax purposes for the optionees would
have been equal to the difference between the option price of $12.15 and the price on the
date of the exercise: $18 to $19, if exercised before the tender announcement, and $25, if
exercised immediately after the announcement.
98. The committee was composed of two newly-appointed, outside directors. Maldo-
nado, 413 A.2d at 1255.
99. Id at 1257.
100. Id
101. Id
102. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
103. 413 A.2d at 1259-60. Accord Dent, supra note 8, at 607; Coffee & Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 265-66. In addition to arguing that the third party model is distinguishable from
derivative suits brought against the directors for alleged self-dealing or breach of fiduciary
duties, Coffee and Schwartz further limit these decisions on the basis of their historical con-
text. Prior to 1880, federal courts had no federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, derivative
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rule to the nature of the derivative suit.1°4
The court concluded that where a shareholder has alleged breach of
fiduciary duties, and the corporation has refused to institute legal proceed-
ings, the shareholder possesses an independent right to redress the wrong.
This right, moreover, cannot be terminated by an independent committee
of board members, since the corporation's right is secondary to that of the
shareholder's by virtue of the corporation's refusal to bring suit.' Ac-
cordingly, Zapata's motion to dismiss was denied.
Zapata immediately filed an interlocutory appeal with the Delaware
Supreme Court. The court began its analysis by stating the lower court's
assertion that "the business judgment rule is irrelevant to the question of
whether the Committee has the authority to compel dismissal of this
suit."'0 6 While recognizing the contrary assertions of other courts, 10 7 the
supreme court agreed with the lower court since the business judgment
rule is generally a defense to an attack on the soundness of a corporate
decision. The rule creates a presumption of propriety of decisions made by
corporate directors; it is based on a practical recognition of human fallibil-
ity and also on the need for judicial economy. Therefore, the rule does not
come into play until after a decision to dismiss the litigation is attacked as
improper. 108
Unlike the lower court, however, the Delaware Supreme Court did not
reach the conclusion that Delaware law gives a shareholder an independ-
ent right to continue litigation over the objections of the corporation. 0 9
suits were used collusively to create diversity of citizenship and enable federal courts to
entertain causes of action otherwise outside their jurisdiction.
104. The court relied on a 1932 opinion of Chancellor Wolcott in Cantor v. Sachs, 162 A.
73, 76 (Del. Ch. 1932), for its discussion of the historical evolution of the derivative suit: "A
bill filed by stockholders in their derivative right therefore has two phases-one is the
equivalent of a suit to compel the corporation to sue, and the other is the suit by the stock-
holders in its behalf, against those liable to it." fd at 76. In discussing the first phase of the
derivative suit, Cantor referred to that phase as the "individual right" of the stockholder.
Id See also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970):
For the fact is that a shareholder's suit was not originally viewed in this country, or
in England, as a suit to enforce a corporate cause of action. Rather, the share-
holder's suit was initially permitted only against the managers of the corporation-
not third parties-and it was conceived of as an equitable action to enforce the
right of a beneficiary against his trustee. The shareholder was not, therefore, in
court to enforce indirectly the corporate right of action, but to enforce directly his
own equitable right of action against an unfaithful fiduciary.
396 U.S. at 545 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
105. See Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1263.
106. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 781-82.
107. See supra note 16.




Although the supreme court agreed with the Vice Chancellor that the busi-
ness judgment rule does not grant an independent committee the authority
to terminate a shareholder suit,"' it rejected the lower court's determina-
tion that in a derivative suit the shareholder's right takes priority over the
corporation's right.I" The court argued that the rule of the lower court
would permit the interest of one person or group to prevail over all others
within the corporate entity." 2
Instead, the court looked to relevant statutory law" 13 and asserted that
an independent committee does possess the corporate power to seek termi-
nation of a derivative suit.' Title 8, section 141(c) of the Delaware Code
permits a board of directors to designate committees and, absent any re-
110. Id.
111. Id at 784-85.
112. Id at 785.
113. The court examined DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a) and (c) (1974 & Supp. 1980)
to conclude that the corporation has the power to appoint an independent committee to
decide whether or not to pursue litigation on behalf of the corporation. Subsection 141(a)
states:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be other-
wise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such pro-
vision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred
or imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or per-
formed to such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the
certificate of incorporation.
Subsection 141(c) states:
The board of directors may by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board,
designate I or more committees, each committee to consist of I or more of the
directors of the corporation. The board may designate I or more directors as alter-
native members of any commitiee, who may replace any absent or disqualified
member at any meeting of the committee. The bylaws may provide that in the
absence or disqualification of a member of a committee, the member or members
present at any meeting and not disqualified from voting, whether or not he or they
constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another member of the board of
directors to act at the meeting in the place of any such absent or disqualified mem-
ber. Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the board of
directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business
and affairs of the corporation, and may authorize the seal of the corporation to be
affixed to all papers which may require it; but no such committee shall have the
power or authority in reference to amending the certificate of incorporation, adopt-
ing an agreement of merger or consolidation, recommending to the stockholders
the sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's property
and assets, recommending to the stockholders a dissolution of the corporation or a
revocation of a dissolution, or amending the bylaws of the corporation; and, unless
the resolution, bylaws, or certificate of incorporation expressly so provide, no such
committee shall have the power or authority to declare a dividend or to authorize
the issuance of stock.
114. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 785.
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strictions or limitations in the corporation's by laws or articles of incorpo-
ration, provides that the committees shall have the same power in the
management and affairs of the corporation as does the board of direc-
tors." '5 Moreover, the court concluded that an independent committee
would have the power to terminate a derivative suit if the full board would
also have that power."
6
Although recognizing that, under the rule in McKee v. Rogers," 7 a
stockholder will not "be permitted . . . to invade the discretionary field
committed to the judgment of the directors" when demand had been made
and refused,"' the court pointed out two common exceptions to this rule:
when, after demand has been made and refused, the shareholder proves
the board's refusal to sue is wrongful, and when demand on the board
would be futile." 9 The court, again looking to title 8, section 141 (c) of the
Delaware Code, asserted that the board retains its managerial authority
(which extends to controlling corporate litigation) even after a shareholder
is permitted to bring suit because of a wrongful refusal to sue.' 20 The
board still retains authority; the court will not respect wrongful use of that
authority. '
2'
The second exception was directly at issue in Zapata. Since all of the
directors were named as defendants in Maldonado's suit, a demand on the
board was alleged to be futile. 122 Even where demand has been excused,
the board, or its committee, maintains managerial power over the corpora-
tion. According to the court, the problem with a futile demand is not the
absence of power on the shareholder's part but rather the lack of disinter-
ested board members. The court asserted that the recognition of a futile
demand, under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not
strip the board of its power. Rather, it is designed to save a shareholder the
time and expense of making a demand on a board tainted with self-
interest.1
23
Recognizing that the board retains the power to make decisions regard-
ing corporate litigation, the court next considered under what circum-
stances a board may delegate its authority to a committee when the
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1980). See supra note 113.
116. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 785.
117. 156 A. 191 (Del. Ch. 1931).
118. Id at 193.
119. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
120. Id at 786.
121. Id
122. Id at 780.
123. Id at 786.
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majority of board members are alleged wrongdoers.' 24 The court refuted
the lower court's assertion that a shareholder has an independent right to
litigate corporate rights since that would result in one shareholder control-
ling the destiny of the corporation. 125 On the other hand, the court was
concerned that a blanket grant of managerial discretion to terminate suits
solely on the basis of the business judgment rationale would lessen the
efficacy of derivative suits as instruments to police corporate actions.
26
Rather than adopting either of these extremes, the Delaware Supreme
Court devised a two-step approach for lower courts to follow when faced
with a motion by an independent committee to dismiss a suit. 127 In enter-
taining the motion to dismiss by the corporation's committee, the court
must first "inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee
and the bases supporting its conclusions."' 12 Traditionally, this has been
the only step employed by those courts recognizing application of the busi-
ness judgment rule. 129 Additionally, the corporation now has the burden of
proof; a court will not presume that the corporation acted with good faith
and independently or that it conducted a reasonable investigation.130 If the
corporation fails to meet this burden, or if a court is otherwise dissatisfied
with this process, the motion to dismiss will be denied and the suit will
continue to a trial on the merits.
13 1
If, however, the court is satisfied that these standards are met, then, at its
discretion, it may proceed to the next step and determine, using its own
independent business judgment, whether or not the motion should be
granted. 32 In addition to considering the best interests of the corporation,
124. Id
125. Id at 784-85 (citing with approval Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980)).
126. 430 A.2d at 786.
127. Id at 788-89. The court admitted that the independent committee's motion could
not be easily "labeled" as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action or under a
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court characterized the procedure as a "hy-
brid summary judgment motion for dismissal." The court analogized its "hybrid" motion to
the court's role when there is a request to terminate litigation in favor of a proposed settle-
ment. Id at 787. In Neponsit Investment Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979),
the court held that it must exercise its own business judgment when considering whether to
accept a settlement of a shareholder derivative suit. The Zapata court also considered the
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 41(a)(2) that applies when a plaintiff seeks dismissal after
the defendant's answer. This rule provides that the action will be dismissed only "upon
order of the Court and upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems proper." DEL.
CH. R. 41(a)(2), quoted in Zapata, 430 A.2d at 488.
128. 430 A.2d at 788.
129. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
130. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89.
131. See id at 788.
132. See id at 789.
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the court may also consider matters of law and public policy. 3" The court
asserted that this step was essential "in striking the balance between legiti-
mate corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a
corporation's best interests as expressed by an independent investigating
committee."
34
V. ZAPA TA: MIDDLE GROUND?
In an attempt to strike a middle ground between frivolous shareholder
derivative suits and unchecked corporate power to dismiss derivative suits,
the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion generates more confusion in this
area of corporate law than had existed previously. In a decision based
more on policy than legal considerations, the court rejects the traditional
rationale of the business judgment rule in situations where the shareholder
has brought a properly initiated suit. Although agreeing that Delaware law
permits the establishment of a committee to make litigation decisions,' 35
the court will not defer to these committees when a demand on the board
would be futile. The court will not presume the committee's independence
but, instead, requires the committee to show affirmatively its independence
and good faith. The court thus recognizes the potential of structural bias
and subconscious abuse inherent in directors passing judgment on fellow
directors. '
36
Although the court states that one of its goals is to ensure the effective-
ness of the derivative suit as a means of policing directors, the nebulous
guidelines developed by the court do little to ensure that a shareholder's
suit will be heard on its merits. The court grants broad discretion to the
lower courts in assessing whether the committee's motion to dismiss should
be denied. 3' The motion to dismiss can be denied when the lower court
determines that the committee is not independent or has not made a rea-
sonable investigation, or when the lower court is "not satisfied for other
reasons relating to the process."'13 The court expressly states that these
"other reasons" are not limited to the good faith of the committee, but it
fails to define precisely what these "other reasons" or "the process" may
be.
139
133. See id The court provides no examples of public policies or special matters of law
to be considered.
134. See id
135. Id at 785 n.13.
136. Id at 786-87.
137. Id at 785.




It is unlikely that a lower court will deny a committee's motion to dis-
miss on the basis of anything other than a lack of good faith, indepen-
dence, or reasonable investigation. Courts have traditionally limited their
inquiry to these three issues;140 it seems improbable that, with no direction
as to the "other reasons relating to the process," a lower court will delve
into the unknown.' 4' Step one, when stripped of its verbiage, is essentially
an application of the business judgment rationale with the burden of proof
shifted from the plaintiff-shareholder to the corporation.
Even with the burden of proof shifted to the corporation, it is arguable
that the corporation will have little trouble in meeting that burden. Be-
cause the issues of good faith, independence, and a reasonable investiga-
tion are questions of fact, a lower court's determination that these facts
have been established will be upheld, unless the appellate court finds them
to be clearly erroneous.'4 2 In addition, if the lower court grants the com-
mittee's motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, the motion
will be reviewed on the basis of whether there is any material issue of fact
raised as to the good faith, independence and reasonable investigation of
the committee.1
4 3
Although the Delaware Supreme Court might have been suspicious of
the litigation committee of Zapata Corporation because it was appointed
four years after the litigation had been initiated, t ' previous situations in-
volved committees composed of one or more members with impeccable
credentials. 45 In future cases, it is thus likely that a court will be more
140. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
141. Accord Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 329: "Rather, we suspect that courts,
despite the new authority given them by Zapata, will continue to defer to the business judg-
ment justifications that the board offers. Engrained traditions do not disappear overnight;
rather, they persist in ways that have low visibility."
142. See also Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1981), for the "clearly
erroneous" standard employed by a circuit court when reviewing a district court's interpreta-
tion of state law.
143. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 929 (1979). See 6 J. MOORE's, FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.04(1) (2d ed. 1976).
144. 430 A.2d at 787. See also Olson, Delaware Court Addresses Business Judgment Rule,
Legal Times of Washington, June 8, 1981 at 18, col. 4. (suggesting that the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision might have been different if the committee had been appointed
immediately after the initiation of the suit).
145. For example, in Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
the independent committee appointed Justice Joseph Weintraub, former Chief Justice of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, as special counsel. In Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp 1172, 1175
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), the disinterested directors retained the Honorable Stanley H. Fuld, former
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, to advise the board on whether they should
proceed with a suit against the interested directors.
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deferential to a committee's determination than the shifting of the burden
of proof would lead one to believe.
Assuming that a committee meets its burden of proof regarding its good
faith, independence, and reasonable investigation, a lower court can still
exercise its discretion to proceed to the second step. Although the Dela-
ware Supreme Court asserts that the exercise of the court's independent
business judgment is the essential link in establishing the middle ground
between frivolous derivative suits and unchecked committee power to ter-
minate litigation, the court weakens this link by making this exercise dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory. 46 In addition, even when the lower
court chooses to exercise its independent business judgment, the court of-
fers little guidance as to the exercise of that discretion. The court indicates
that the second step is "intended to thwart instances where corporate ac-
tions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy
its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a
stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the corpora-
tion's interest."'' 47 Yet, the court does not articulate when an evaluation of
these considerations is appropriate nor when it is appropriate for a lower
court to consider matters of law and public policy in exercising its business
judgment.
The only possible guidance to be gleaned from this statement of the
"spirit" of the two-step approach is earlier in the opinion, where the Dela-
ware Supreme Court adopts the lower court's assertion that the substantive
judgment to dismiss a shareholder suit, even when involving ethical, pro-
motional, commercial, public and employee relations, is within the scope
of judicial review.' 48 Although aware of the danger of judicial overreach-
ing into the affairs of the corporation, the court is persuaded that the dan-
ger is outweighed by the possibility of foreclosing a judicial determination
on the merits. 4' This discussion of a judicial determination on the merits
is confusing in light of the discretionary power given to the lower court to
exercise its independent business judgment. Unless the lower court chooses
to proceed to this second step, there will be no judicial determination of
the merits, since the first step is designed primarily to determine the good
faith, independence, and reasonable investigation of the committee.
The court, in attempting to accommodate the interests of judicial econ-
omy, corporate control of its business affairs, and the effectiveness of
shareholder suits as a control on corporate abuse, may succeed in creating
146. See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 330.
147. 430 A.2d at 789.




more confusion in this area rather than an effective middle ground. The
impact of Zapata is likely to be significant in curbing the "clear trend" in
corporate law where motions to dismiss are evaluated solely on the basis of
the business judgment rationale, as a large number of shareholder suits
arise under Delaware law. 5' At least one commentator has predicted that
the Zapata decision will become a model in other states, as well as in fed-
eral courts, applying Delaware and other state law.'
5 '
VI. CONCLUSION
By departing from the rationale of the business judgment rule and call-
ing for a judicial role in determining whether a motion to dismiss should
be granted, the Delaware Supreme Court opens itself to the criticism that
courts should seldom interfere with the internal affairs of corporations.
Properly viewed, however, the court does not advocate judicial interfer-
ence with business decisions; more accurately, the court is concerned with
determining when and on what basis a motion to dismiss should be
granted. In this respect, the court ensures that courts, and not litigants,
decide the merits of litigation. Nevertheless, the success of the Delaware
Supreme Court's effort to limit the power to terminate shareholder's deriv-
ative suits will depend largely on the lower courts' application of the two-
step approach.
Joyce Murty
150. For a general discussion of the primacy of Delaware as the state of incorporation,
see Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law- Re/fec/ions Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
151. See Olson, supra note 144, at 19, col. 3.
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